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Note
The Life of the Party: Analyzing Political
Parties' First Amendment Associational
Rights when the Primary Election Process
Is Construed Along a Continuum
Lauren Hancock*
It is regrettable that in an era marked by doubt and confusion, an era
whose greatest need is steadfastness of thought and purpose, this
court, which has been looked to as exhibiting consistency in adjudica-
tion, and a steadiness which would hold the balance even in the face
of temporary ebbs and flows of opinion, should now itself become the
breeder of fresh doubt and confusion in the public mind as to the sta-
bility of our institutions.'
More than fifty years after Justice Roberts delivered these
words in the dissent to a famous election law case, elections are
still "marked by doubt and confusion," and the public continues
to rely upon courts for resolutions.2 Some people might wonder
in particular what Justice Roberts would make of the decision
delivered by the Supreme Court in California Democratic Party
v. Jones.3 In Jones, the Supreme Court declared that Califor-
nia's blanket primary unconstitutionally infringed upon politi-
cal parties' First Amendment rights of free association.4 The
primaries utilized by Alaska and Washington were of the same
type as California, and thus also invalidated, but the decision
* J.D. Candidate 2004, University of Minnesota Law School; B.S. 1998,
magna cum laude, Loyola University of Chicago. For encouragement and ad-
vice throughout the writing process I am tremendously grateful to Professor
Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Hansem Dawn Kim, Shannon Garrett, and Emily
Pruisner. I also thank the Board and Staff of the Minnesota Law Review for
their technical editorial assistance. Finally, this Note is dedicated to Matt
Brown, a beloved and constant reminder of all of life's balancing tests.
1. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 670 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
2. The most notable, or notorious, instance in recent history is the
Court's decision in Bush v. Gore, which "effectively ended the presidential
election." Cass R. Sunstein, Bush v. Gore: Order Without Law, 68 U. CHI. L.
REV. 737, 758 (2001).
3. 530 U.S. 567 (2000).
4. Id. at 586.
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suggested that the unique and much-troubled format of the
"nonpartisan" blanket primary in Louisiana would survive con-
stitutional scrutiny.5 The Court in Jones did not, however, spe-
cifically consider how its decision affected the open primary
election,6 a system significantly more prevalent than the blan-
ket primary in the United States.7 While many legal scholars
agree with the dissent's claim that the reasoning employed in
Jones implies that open primaries are unconstitutional," this
Note suggests that the open primary survives constitutional
scrutiny if one takes seriously the Court's distinction between
political party membership and affiliation. Further, this Note
suggests that the Court's seemingly inconsistent primary elec-
tion law jurisprudence can be made consistent by employing a
tripartite model of political parties and understanding the pri-
mary electoral process as a series of events along a continuum.
Along this continuum, each stage requires a balancing and
shifting of the First Amendment rights of each component of
the political party.
Part I of this Note discusses the different types of primary
systems and explains how the evolution of the direct primary
itself led to the development of these distinct systems. Part II of
this Note explains the components of a political party in a way
that can be useful in evaluating the legal analyses employed by
5. Id. at 585. Louisiana conducts its own variation of the blanket pri-
mary, the nonpartisan blanket primary, in which voters may choose candi-
dates from either party, regardless of affiliation. John R. Labbe, Comment,
Louisiana's Blanket Primary After California Democratic Party v. Jones, 96
NW. U. L. REV. 721, 742 (2002). The two candidates who receive the highest
number of votes are then nominated for the general election. Id. This nonpar-
tisan primary format was the system advocated by the majority in Jones as a
means of avoiding the constitutional infractions presented by blanket prima-
ries. See id. (discussing Louisiana's unique brand of the blanket primary and
its questionable constitutional status under the Jones analysis).
6. Jones, 530 U.S. at 578 n.8 ("This case does not require us to determine
the constitutionality of open primaries.").
7. See infra note 18.
8. Justice Stevens, joined in this part of the dissent by Justice Ginsburg,
stated that under the majority's analysis "there is surely a danger that open
primaries will fare no better against a First Amendment challenge than blan-
ket primaries have." Jones, 530 U.S. at 598 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also
Nathaniel Persily, Toward a Functional Defense of Political Party Autonomy,
76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 750, 787 (2001) (calling the Court's distinction between open
and blanket primaries "arbitrary," and suggesting that even closed and semi-
closed primaries would be invalidated under the Jones analysis); Labbe, supra
note 5, at 740 (suggesting that "distinguishing the effect of the open primary
on a party's associational rights from the effect of California's blanket primary
appears extremely difficult").
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the courts in election law cases. Part III presents a critical line
of cases leading up to the Jones decision and focuses on the
First Amendment associational rights in question at each stage
of the election process. Finally, Part IV proffers the author's
model for squaring the seemingly incongruous decisions in pri-
mary election law cases. This model suggests that the weighing
and balancing of the associational rights at issue in election
law cases must be conducted along an "electoral process con-
tinuum," using a tripartite definition of political parties, with
the rights of each component of the party given different weight
at each stage of the continuum.
I. PRIMARY SYSTEMS AND THE EFFORTS
OF EVOLUTION
Primaries can be categorized generally as closed, open, or
blanket systems, with some of the distinctions among the sys-
tems subtle but instrumental.9 The following sections detail
each type of primary and describe how the direct primary
evolved into the system it is today.
A. THE CLOSED AND SEMI-CLOSED PRIMARIES
A strictly closed primary system allows only voters for-
mally affiliated in advance ° with the political party to partici-
pate in that party's primary.1 In closed primary states, affilia-
9. See FEC, Party Affiliation and Primary Voting 2000, at
http://www.fec.gov/votregis/primaryvoting.htm [hereinafter, Party Affiliation
and Primary Voting].
10. The formal affiliation process is distinct from the formal registration
process. See ALEXANDER J. BOTT, HANDBOOK OF UNITED STATES ELECTION
LAWS AND PRACTICES 22-23, 42-44 (1990). Voter registration is required be-
fore a person can vote, and registration laws function as a tool to combat fraud
by ensuring that only qualified people vote and that they only vote once. Id. at
42. Formal party affiliation, on the other hand, is required by states with
closed primary elections, as a way to determine who is eligible to vote in each
party's primary. Id. at 22-23. Closed primary states have different require-
ments regarding how far in advance of the primary a voter must declare party
affiliation, and some even allow previously unaffiliated voters to formally af-
filiate at the polls. Id. States with other forms of primaries encourage voter
affiliation, but it is not a requirement to vote in the party primary. Id.
11. See id. at 19. The type of primary a state employs can change with
each election, and some rules vary with party or office. See id. at 19-25. Ac-
cording to the most recent data available, seventeen states have fully closed
primaries in which independent or unaffiliated voters cannot participate.
Party Affiliation and Primary Voting, supra note 9.
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tion is equated with party membership." Some states employ a
slight variation on the closed primary called the "semi-closed
primary."13 In the semi-closed primary, formally affiliated party
members can only vote in the primary of the party with which
they are registered, but independent and unaffiliated voters
can vote in either party's primary.' It is critical to note that in
most states with semi-closed primaries, some act of party af-
filiation is required on voting day."1 For example, at the polls in
some states, unaffiliated voters must publicly choose one
party's ballot or declare affiliation in another way, thereby en-
rolling them with that party.
16
B. THE OPEN PRIMARY
In an open primary, any person, regardless of party mem-
bership or affiliation prior to voting, may vote for the candidate
of his choosing, but the voter must choose candidates for all of-
fices from one party. 7 Thus, if the voter selects a Republican
candidate for governor, the voter must select a Republican can-
didate for all other offices on the ballot as well. 8 Open prima-
ries effectively allow all voters to participate in a party's pri-
mary, whether they are registered with the party, registered
with another party, or not registered with any party, as long as
12. See V.0. KEY, POLITICS, PARTIES, & PRESSURE GROUPS 390 (5th ed.
1964) (stating that enrolling with a party when registering to vote is the "most
common mode of determination of party membership," and that this enroll-
ment serves as a recorded "assertion of affiliation").
13. According to the most recent data available, nine states' primaries
could be considered a form of semi-closed primary. Party Affiliation and Pri-
mary Voting, supra note 9.
14. Persily, supra note 8, at 787-88 n.155.
15. In Colorado, independent voters must declare affiliation at the polls,
which enrolls them with a particular party. COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-7-201 (2002)
(stating that "[i]f unaffiliated, the eligible elector shall openly declare to the
election judges the name of the major political party with which the elector
wishes to affiliate," after which the election judge "shall deliver the appropri-
ate party ballot to the eligible voter"); see also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-3301
(2000) (stating that voters must declare a party affiliation in order to vote in
the primary, which can be done at the polls on election day, but that "such a
statement of party affiliation shall constitute a declaration of party affiliation"
that will be preserved for five years); TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 162.003
(Vernon 1986) (stating that "a person becomes affiliated with a political party
when the person is accepted to vote in the party's primary election").
16. See supra note 15.
17. BOTT, supra note 10, at 138.
18. See id. According to the most recent data available, twenty states con-
duct "open primaries." Party Affiliation and Primary Voting, supra note 9.
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they select only one party's candidates for all offices.' 9 Unlike
the semi-closed primary, this participation does not generally
enroll the voter with the party for whose candidates he voted,
though in most states the parties have access to the voter
lists.2 0 Thus, in open primary states, the act of voting for one
party's candidates for all offices essentially constitutes an act of
affiliation with that party, rather than an act of membership.2
The open primary system most clearly adheres to a distinction
between "political membership" and "political affiliation," a dis-
tinction that proves crucial when interpreting Jones and apply-
ing it to the context of open primaries.22
C. THE BLANKET PRIMARY
Finally, a blanket primary can be considered an extension
of the open primary.23 In a blanket primary, any person, regard-
less of party membership or affiliation, may vote for a party's
nominee.24 Unlike the open primary, however, the voter may
switch between parties when voting for each office on the bal-
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See Democratic Party of United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette,
450 U.S. 107, 130 n.2 (1981) ("[T]he act of voting in the Democratic primary
fairly can be described as an act of affiliation with the Democratic Party.").
22. See Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 577 n.8 (2000) (sug-
gesting that because voters in open primaries affiliate themselves with one
party through the act of voting in that party's primary, open primaries are
likely constitutional). The dissent in Jones questioned this distinction. See id.
at 597-98 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the majority drew an "un-
principled distinction among various primary configurations" and "cast serious
doubt on" the constitutionality of open and semi-closed primaries).
23. See BOTT, supra note 10, at 139. The California blanket primary was
at issue in Jones, and at the time of the Jones decision, Washington and
Alaska also conducted blanket primaries. Gary D. Allison, Protecting Party
Purity in the Selection of Nominees for Public Office: The Supremes Strike
Down California's Blanket Primaries and Endanger the Open Primaries of
Many States, 36 TULSA L.J. 59, 64-67 (2000). Washington adopted its blanket
primary in 1935, and Alaska enacted the blanket primary through referendum
in 1947. Id. at 65. After Jones, the Alaska Supreme Court declared its state's
blanket primary system unconstitutional. See O'Callaghan v. State, Dir. of
Elections, 6 P.3d 728, 731 (Alaska 2000). The Washington Supreme Court has
twice upheld the constitutionality of Washington's blanket primary, but the
Ninth Circuit recently declared it unconstitutional. See Anderson v. Millikin,
59 P.2d 295, 296-97 (Wash. 1936); Heavey v. Chapman, 611 P.2d 1256 (Wash.
1980); see also Democratic Party of Wash. State v. Reed, Nos. 02-35422, 02-
35424, 02-35428, 2003 WL 22119926, at *5 (9th Cir. Sept. 15, 2003).
24. BOTT, supra note 10, at 139.
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lot.25 So, for example, a voter may choose a Republican candi-
date for governor, a Democratic candidate for secretary of state,
and a Green candidate for state representative. In a blanket
primary, no formal act of party affiliation is required prior to
voting, and no party affiliation is produced as a result of vot-
ing.27 In states with blanket primaries, a major goal of the sys-
tem is to get as many people as possible out to vote for the can-
didates, regardless of the voter's party affiliation and
regardless of the candidate's party affiliation.28
D. THE EVOLUTION OF THE DIRECT PRIMARY
The history of the direct primary and its evolution into
each of these distinct formats is significant. The direct primary
was born as a tool to take the nominating process out of the
hands of the party elites and place it into the hands of the gen-
eral electorate.29 Originally, legislative caucuses were used to
nominate candidates for state office.3" At legislative caucuses,
groups of elected officials from each party chose the party can-
didates for the primary ballot.31 By 1800, the legislative caucus
was the prevailing mode of nomination in the states.32 The leg-
islative caucus nomination system quickly buckled under criti-
cism, however, because it placed the power to nominate in the
hands of the controlling party in Congress.3 This system left no
room for the minority party in the legislature to have a voice in
34the nominating process.
In an attempt to make the process more democratic, the
caucus system over time was replaced with the convention sys-
25. Id.
26. See id.
27. See id. at 21.
28. See Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 570 (1981). See also
Elisabeth R. Gerber, California's Experience with the Blanket Primary, in
CONGRESSIONAL PRIMARIES AND THE POLITICS OF REPRESENTATION 143, 149
(Peter F. Galderisi et al. eds., 2001) for an interesting discussion of this theory
and a statistical analysis of whether California's blanket primary did in fact
turn out an increased number of voters.
29. See PAUL ALLEN BECK & FRANK J. SORAUF, PARTY POLITICS IN
AMERICA 232-34 (7th ed. 1992) (stating that "the primary was designed to re-
form the nominating processes by 'democratization'").
30. KEY, supra note 12, at 371.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 372.
34. Id.
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tem, in the hopes that a convention would allow for a more rep-
resentative method of nomination.35 Conventions began as state
or national party meetings attended by delegates who had been
selected by local party members and leaders.36 The delegates
were charged with the responsibility of "transmitting, from
local assemblies, the wishes and impulses of the mass of party
membership to a central point, where the selection of nominees
was made."37 The convention model of candidate selection
quickly caught on, but eventually it too drew criticisms con-
cerning the degree of party control exercised by sending hand-
picked delegates to the conventions to make the party-approved
candidate selections. 38 The manipulation of the process of dele-
gate selection went so far as to include intimidation, bribes,
and occasionally physical violence, and the general electorate
was left with little power to influence the process."
In 1902, in response to the continued corruption, Progres-
sive Wisconsin Governor Robert M. La Follette authorized leg-
islation instituting the first compulsory statewide primary elec-
tion.4° This effort was his attempt to return to the earliest
principles of democracy by going "back to the people" to nomi-
nate the parties' candidates for election.4' Within fifteen years,
the direct primary had been implemented as a nomination form
in nearly every state.42
Just as the shift from legislative caucuses to conventions
did not entirely neutralize the power struggle that dominated
the selection process, however, the shift from conventions to
35. Id. at 373 (stating that "[tihe convention was a means for the expres-
sion of the 'popular will' of the party").
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 374.
39. Id. During this period the party was still an entirely private associa-
tion that was not subject to any federal or state regulation. Id. at 375. This
seldom-referenced fact undoubtedly contributed to the corruption of the con-
ventions. In 1886, legal restrictions were placed on conventions and caucuses,
but "[by the time that regulation became fairly general, the convention sys-
tem was on the way out." Id.
40. BECK & SORAUF, supra note 29, at 233.
41. Id.; see also KEY, supra note 12, at 375 ("To [the Progressives] the di-
rect primary constituted a means by which an enlightened people might cut
through the mesh of organized and privileged power and grasp control of the
government.").
42. See KEY, supra note 12, at 375-77. In the states where the direct pri-
mary is not used as a nomination system, it is used to settle challenges among
candidates selected through the caucus or convention system. Id. at 377.
20031
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direct primaries also failed to entirely eliminate the factional
struggle for control.43 While the direct primary did allow for
broader and easier mass participation in candidate nomina-
tions,4 this new power wielded by the electorate necessarily in-
fluenced candidate approaches to winning a place on the pri-
mary ballot. The direct primary system encouraged candidates
to make concerted appeals to voters, instead of tailoring their
messages to the party elites who had controlled the caucuses
and conventions.45 Shifting the bulk of nominating power to the
electorate also forced the parties to change their approaches to
winning. In a direct primary the party leaders could not effec-
tively dominate the nominating process, and they were under
increased pressure to prevent the party from splitting into fac-
tions, each in support of its own candidate.46 Having weakened
control over their nominee, the party elites tried to thwart
maverick candidates that might appeal to primary voters but
lose in the general election.47 In effect, the shift to the direct
primary as the most prevalent nominating method in state
elections represented a shift from one extreme-a concentra-
tion of power in the hands of party elites-to the other-a con-
centration of power in the hands of the electorate.
II. THE TRIPARTITE MODEL OF POLITICAL PARTIES
The problem with presenting this power struggle to the
courts for resolution is that in most election law jurisprudence,
the courts have failed to develop a coherent and functional un-
derstanding of political parties." As one critic noted, "[t] he pre-
sent Court-lacking even a single member with significant
43. See id. at 378.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 378-79.
46. Id. at 386.
47. See id. It is important to note, though, that the party-organization still
has avenues to exert its influence, for example, in preprimary conventions or
through preprimary endorsement procedures. See MALCOLM E. JEWELL &
DAVID M. OLSON, POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELECTIONS IN AMERICAN STATES 94
(3d ed. 1988); see also infra Part III.A.
48. See Samuel Issacharoff, Private Parties with Public Purposes: Political
Parties, Associational Freedoms, and Partisan Competition, 101 COLUM. L.
REV. 274, 279 (2001) (stating that throughout the caselaw there is persistent
"legal uncertainty about what the party actually is"); see also Elizabeth
Garrett, Is the Party Over? Courts and the Political Process, 2002 SUP. CT.
REV. 95, 95 (2002) (suggesting that the judiciary "has failed to develop sophis-
ticated positive and normative views of political parties, resulting in a juris-
prudence of the political process that is inconsistent and unsatisfying").
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electoral experience-simply does not understand elections and
political parties. Its decisions on the political process are mud-
dled, ungrounded, and poorly reasoned."49 Functional models,
however, familiar to lawyers and legal scholars, do exist.50 For
example, one widely accepted definition of a political party, the
tripartite model, suggests that the political party consists of
three components: the party-organization, the party-in-
government, and the party-in-the-electorate. 5' Each of these
components can be defined in terms of membership, function,
and goals, which may overlap at some points and conflict at
other points throughout the electoral process.
The party-organization is composed of party activists-the
individuals working on the campaigns, attending conventions,
and recruiting other party members. 52 The party-organization
can be described as "a system of layers of organization" that
must collaborate to reach the major objective of winning the
election. 3 In practical terms, "the party-organization is the
formal apparatus of the precincts, wards, cities, counties, con-
gressional districts, and state that results from the legislation
of the state itself."4 The goal of the party-organization is to
nominate candidates for office that will win in the general elec-
tion.55 To reach this goal, the party-organization is responsible
for jobs such as grooming candidates for the ballot, running
campaigns, organizing conventions, and fund-raising. 6 Addi-
tionally, the party-organization is responsible for mobilizing
electoral support, serving as a link between the electorate, can-
didates, people, and government.
57
49. Gerald M. Pomper, The Fate of Political Parties, 2 ELECTION L.J. 69,
69 (2003).
50. See Garrett, supra note 48, at 95 (employing Key's tripartite model at
length in a legal analysis of courts and the political process); Nathaniel Per-
sily, Candidates v. Parties: The Constitutional Constraints on Primary Ballot
Access Laws, 89 GEO. L.J. 2181, 2185 (2001) (stating that "V.0. Key's tripar-
tite classification scheme is now familiar to lawyers").
51. This tripartite model was developed by political scientist V.0. Key.
See supra note 12; see also Nathaniel Persily & Bruce E. Cain, The Legal
Status of Political Parties: A Reassessment of Competing Paradigms, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 775, 778 (2000) (calling Key's model "a foundational work of
political science").
52. See BECK & SORAUF, supra note 29, at 132-33.
53. KEY, supra note 12, at 316.
54. BECK & SORAUF, supra note 29, at 63.
55. KEY, supra note 12, at 315-16.
56. Id. at 316; BECK & SORAUF, supra note 29, at 18.
57. KEY, supra note 12, at 314.
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The party-in-government (party-government) is composed
of the party's elected officials, who form groups in solidarity
with their party in the legislature and take responsibility for
government action." The members of the party-government
must function as public officials while maintaining a party role,
because one of the major goals of the party-government is to be
the party in the majority.59 The role of the party-government in
the minority is to "assail governmental ineptitude, serve as a
point for the coalescence of discontent, propose alternative gov-
ernmental policies, and influence the behavior of the majority
as well as lay plans to throw it out of power."
60
The party-in-the-electorate (party-electorate) is "[w]ithin
the body of voters as a whole, groups ... formed of persons who
regard themselves as party members."61 Significantly, the
party-electorate is not defined as the whole body of voters it-
self.62 The party-electorate is instead a group within the whole
body of voters that affiliates itself with the party in some way,
either through formal party membership or by voting for the
party's candidates in the primaries and general elections.63 The
function of the party-electorate is to choose the party-
government, and the goal of the party-electorate is to carry the
best candidates for office to victory.64
III. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS OF PARTY RIGHTS
UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT
While the Court has not overtly employed either this tri-
partite framework or any particular model of political parties in
its analyses, it is helpful to bear the tripartite model in mind
when reviewing election law jurisprudence, because at times
the Court implicitly suggests a familiarity with this model or
even inadvertently conducts its analysis in such a way that
58. Id. at 206-07.
59. See id. at 206.
60. Id. at 207.
61. Id. at 164.
62. Id.
63. See id. The party-electorate can be formal members of a party or the
people who affiliate with the party in another way and typically "react in
characteristic ways to public issues." Id. The party-electorate is an "amor-
phous group," but one with a "social reality." Id. The electorate only has a
voice in the process at the final stage, via the act of voting in the primary, and
"It]he nature of [the electorate's] role is fixed by the choices presented to [it] by
the party[-organization]." Id. at 520.
64. See BECK & SORAUF, supra note 29, at 143.
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conforms to this model.65 The cases discussed below present an
overview of the Court's analysis of the electoral process in the
context of parties' First Amendment rights. In these cases, the
precise party rights at issue are rights of freedom of association
and expression, as derived from the First Amendment.66 Under
contemporary interpretations of the First Amendment as ap-
plied to political parties, the Court's "primary concern [is] with
identifying and protecting private expression against govern-
mental regulatory excesses."67 Thus, a First Amendment in-
quiry into party activity requires a balancing of private rights
of association and expression with the degree and necessity of
government regulation applied to associative and expressive
activities.68
Through a review of the Court's recent First Amendment
case law, the following sections analyze the Court's treatment
of the electoral process in the critical stages leading to the gen-
eral election: ballot access, endorsement procedures, party con-
ventions, and finally the primary itself.
A. THE PREPRIMARY CASES
The preprimary cases involve the first three stages of the
electoral process: ballot access, endorsement procedures, and
party conventions. At each stage leading to the primary the
Court must consider the degree to which the state's interest in
regulating the electoral process can burden the parties' associa-
tional rights.
1. Ballot Access
The first stage of the electoral process is the preprimary
ballot access stage, during which the names that will go on the
ballot are selected. 69 Ballot access was at issue in Timmons v.
Twin Cities Area New Party,° where the Court noted that al-
65. See infra Part IV.B.1 and Part IV.B.2 (discussing such instances).
66. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
67. Gregory P. Magarian, Regulating Political Parties Under a "Public
Rights" First Amendment, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1939, 1951 (2003) (describ-
ing this as the "private rights theory," as opposed to the "public rights theory,"
where the Court is primarily concerned with the rights of the public to dis-
seminate and receive information).
68. Id. at 1952.
69. See BOTT, supra note 10, at 93, 96-107 (discussing the history and de-
velopment of ballot access laws and detailing the ballot access laws of each
state).
70. 520 U.S. 351 (1997).
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though a party had a "right to select its own candidate," it did
not follow "that a party is absolutely entitled to have its nomi-
nee appear on the ballot as that party's candidate. 7' The spe-
cific laws in question were Minnesota's antifusion statutes,
which prohibited candidates from appearing on the ballot as
candidates of more than one political party.72 While recognizing
the party's associational rights, the Court asserted that, in bal-
ancing the party's rights and the state's interest, the party does
not suffer a severe burden on its associational rights when the
state prevents it from running as its candidate someone who is
on the ballot as another party's candidate. 7  The Court ac-
knowledged that the state regulations do impose some burden
on the party, 74 but that the state's interest in protecting ballot
integrity and political stability outweighs this burden on the
party's associational rights. 5 In addition, the Court maintained
that, despite being prevented from getting its candidate on the
ballot under its party label, the "party retains great latitude in
its ability to communicate ideas to voters and candidates
through its participation in the campaign, and party members
may campaign for, endorse, and vote for their preferred candi-
date even if he is listed on the ballot as another party's candi-
date. 76
2. Endorsement Process
This "great latitude" was acknowledged in a case address-
ing another preprimary stage, the endorsement process. In Eu
71. Id. at 359.
72. Id. at 354. In Timmons, a state representative running as the Democ-
rat-Farmer-Labor Party candidate was nominated by the New Party (a minor
party under Minnesota law) to run as its candidate as well. Id. Minnesota
state law prohibits such "fusion" candidacies. See MINN. STAT. § 204B.04 subd.
1 (2002) (stating that "[n]o individual shall be named on any ballot as the can-
didate of more than one major political party"); MINN. STAT. § 204B.04 subd. 2
(2002) (stating that "[n]o individual who seeks nomination for any partisan or
nonpartisan office at a primary shall be nominated for the same office by
nomination petition"). In Timmons, the New Party had attempted to nominate
its candidate by petition, and in accordance with the statutes, local election
officials refused to accept it. See Timmons, 520 U.S. at 354.
73. Timmons, 520 U.S. at 358-59.
74. Id. at 363 ("We conclude that the burdens Minnesota imposes on the
party's First and Fourteenth Amendment associational rights-though not
trivial-are not severe.").
75. Id. at 369-70.
76. Id. at 363.
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v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Committee,77 the
Court held that state bans on candidate endorsements by party
committees constitute an infringement on rights of political
speech and association.8 The advantages of endorsements can
include a top position on the ballot 79 and party resources such
as financing, organization, and personnel."0 Further, endorse-
ments frequently serve as a cue to loyal party voters, effectively
garnering those votes."' In Eu, the Secretary of State and other
party officials brought suit challenging sections of the Califor-
nia Elections Code8 2 that prevented governing bodies of political
parties from endorsing or opposing candidates in the primary
election. 3 The State argued that the endorsement ban served
its compelling interests in preserving a stable government and
protecting voters from confusion and undue influence.84 While
the Court acknowledged these were compelling state interests,
it held that preventing political parties from endorsing and op-
posing candidates infringes on party associational rights be-
cause those rights include the right to identify and promote
candidates within the association. 5 The Court declared that the
primary election was "the crucial juncture" for the party,6 and
that allowing individuals to endorse candidates but preventing
individuals joined together in a party from endorsing candi-
dates was "clearly a restraint on the right of association."8
7
77. 489 U.S. 214 (1989).
78. Id. at 229.
79. JEWELL & OLSON, supra note 47, at 95.
80. Id. at 99.
81. BECK & SORAUF, supra note 29, at 250.
82. See CAL. ELEC. CODE § 11702 (West 1976) (repealed 1994); CAL. ELEC.
CODE § 29430 (West 1976) (repealed 1994).
83. Eu, 489 U.S. at 217.
84. Id. at 226. The State attempted to argue that the endorsement ban
served its interest in protecting election stability by minimizing the risk of
intraparty friction that the endorsement process may cause. Id. Additionally,
the State argued that the ban protected primary voters from confusion and
undue influence by reducing the possibility for a candidate to claim that a
party endorsed him when it did not. Id. at 228. The Court handily dismissed
both of these arguments. See id. at 227-28.
85. Id. at 224.
86. Id. (quoting Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 216
(1986)).
87. Id. at 224-25 (quoting Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for
Fair Hous. v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 296 (1981)).
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3. Party Conventions
Another stage in the preprimary electoral process that re-
quires the balancing of state interests and party interests is the
party convention.88 The party uses the convention to select can-
didates for the primary, to choose candidates to run in the gen-
eral election (foregoing the primary altogether), or to endorse a
candidate running in the primary. 89 The convention serves as a
place for party members to gather together and engage in col-
lective action, because "[w]ithout conventions people may rely
on a party label or selection at a primary, but not on the bene-
fits gained from a decisionmaking body that meets, discusses,
and hammers out a common plan."90 In Democratic Party of
United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette,9 the Court held
that members of the National Democratic Party had the right
to "define their associational rights by limiting those who could
participate in the processes leading to the selection of delegates
to their National Convention."92 In La Follette, the National
Democratic Party rules regarding delegate selection to the con-
vention were at odds with state election laws governing the
primary and convention.93 The State argued that its law, which
allowed greater participation among the electorate in the selec-
tion of delegates to the convention, imposed only a minor bur-
den on the national party, while advancing state interests in
"preserving the overall integrity of the electoral process, provid-
88. The convention structure is discussed in Part I, supra. While the
party-organization still runs the conventions, since the convention in most
states is no longer the single nomination method, conventions are less prone to
the excessive influence from party elites than they were two hundred years
ago. See BOTT, supra note 10, at 172-75. Many states hold a convention either
before or after the primary. Id. The cases discussed herein pertain to the more
familiar party conventions held for candidates for national office.
89. Id. at 173.
90. Stephen E. Gottlieb, Rebuilding the Right of Association: The Right to
Hold a Convention as a Test Case, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 191, 217 (1982).
91. 450 U.S. 107 (1981).
92. Id. at 122.
93. See id. at 123. The national party rules restricted the selection of
delegates to the convention to Democratic voters. Id. at 109. However, in Wis-
consin, the process of choosing a presidential candidate consisted of an open
primary election, in which anyone could vote (including members of other par-
ties and independents), followed by a caucus where the actual delegates were
selected, and which only party members could attend. Id. at 110-12. The con-
flict arose in that the national party required the delegates to vote in accor-
dance with the results of the open primary election, so in essence while the
delegates themselves were all Democrats, they were bound to vote in accor-
dance with results from an election open to nonmembers. Id. at 112.
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ing secrecy of the ballot, increasing voter participation in pri-
maries, and preventing harassment of voters."94 The Court,
however, held that even if the burden placed on the party by
the state is minor, "[a] political party's choice among the vari-
ous ways of determining the makeup of a State's delegation to
the party's national convention" is a protected First Amend-
ment right of association.95
The Court made its protection of the party's rights at the
convention stage even more explicit in Cousins v. Wigoda,s an-
other case in which the Court struck down state laws regulat-
ing delegate selection, because the state laws violated the na-
tional party's rules governing the party convention. 97 As stated
in Cousins, "[t]he right of members of a political party to gather
in a national political convention in order to formulate proposed
programs and nominate candidates for political office is at the
very heart of the freedom of assembly and association."99
B. THE PRIMARY STAGE CASES LEADING
TO CALIFORNIA DEMOCRATIC PARTY V. JONES
The ballot access, endorsement, and convention stages of
the electoral process are steps along the way to the final stage
of the nomination process, the primary election. The primary
stage not only requires the balancing of state interests and
party interests, but demands a thorough examination of the
rights of the electorate as well, because the primary is ulti-
mately the means by which the electorate can express its can-
didate preferences. 99 The primary was at issue in Nader v.
Schaffer,'00 where the Court held that "[t]he party's selection of
its candidates ... is an ultimate and crucial element of the
party members' political activities,"'' and thus, in the context
of a closed primary election, "[t]he rights of party members may
94. Id. at 123-25. The State was suggesting that its rules advanced these
interests because open primaries increase voter participation, and, in Wiscon-
sin, allow voters to choose which party they will vote for from within the con-
fines of the polling booth. See id. at 125 n.29 (citing the Wisconsin Supreme
Court's identification of state interests).
95. Id. at 123-24.
96. 419 U.S. 477 (1975).
97. Id. at 490-91.
98. Id. at 491 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
99. See KEY, supra note 12, at 520-21.
100. 417 F. Supp. 837 (D. Conn. 1976) (three-judge court), affd mem., 429
U.S. 989 (1976).
101. Id. at 844.
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to some extent offset the importance of claimed conflicting
rights asserted by [nonmembers] challenging some aspect of
the candidate selection process."' In Nader, two registered
voters not affiliated with any party brought suit arguing that
Connecticut's closed primary law violated their associational
rights by preventing them from participating in the state's
closed primary election. 0 3 In its balancing test, the Court de-
termined that the associational rights of the party to keep
nonmembers from participating in the closed party primary
outweigh the voters' asserted rights to associate with that
party by voting in its primary.' Significantly, the Court noted
that the voters in this case made no effort to affiliate in any
way with the party, such as by participating in party caucuses
or conventions, before attempting to vote in the party's pri-
105
mary.
The Court examined Connecticut's primary process again
in Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut.0 6 In Tashjian,
the Connecticut Republican Party brought suit challenging the
state's statute that mandated closed primaries, thus preventing
independents from voting in the primary election. 10 7 Here the
Court stated that the party's attempt to include independent
voters in its closed primary was a valid exercise of its associa-
tional rights."' Citing precedent, the Court likened the party's
attempt to open its elections to independents with the freedom
to identify the people who constitute the association.'09 Addi-
tionally, the Court distinguished this case from Nader and
other cases in which nonmembers of a party seek to vote in that
party's primary, because in those cases "the nonmember's de-
102. Id. at 845.
103. Id. at 840.
104. See id. at 847.
105. Id. at 848.
106. 479 U.S. 208 (1986). After Nader, the Connecticut Republican Party
realized the importance of independent voters and adopted its own rule allow-
ing independent voters to vote in its primaries. Id. at 212. The Democrats
dominated the legislature at the time, and they feared that independent voters
in the primaries could shift control to Republicans; thus, the Democrats
wanted to maintain the state's closed primary system, and they made no effort
to revise state statutes. See id. at 212-13.
107. Id. at 210-11.
108. Id. at 214.
109. Id. at 224 (citing Democratic Party of United States v. Wisconsin ex
rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 123-24 (1981), though failing to note that La
Follette considered associational rights in the context of conventions, not pri-
maries).
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sire to participate in the party's affairs is overborne by the
countervailing and legitimate right of the party to determine
its own membership qualifications."" ° Ultimately Tashjian
stood for the proposition that states could not force parties to
close their primaries off from nonmembers; this holding paved
the way for the Court to consider whether or not a state can
force a party to open its primary to nonmembers, the issue pre-
sented in Jones.
C. THE PRIMARY STAGE:
CALIFORNIA DEMOCRATIC PARTY V. JONES
In Jones, the conflict again involved struggle for power be-
tween the political parties and the state in the primary elec-
toral process.' In 1996, California voters enacted a blanket
primary by referendum,"2 thereby opening all primaries to all
voters regardless of affiliation and allowing voters to choose
candidates from any party for any office.113 In Jones, the state
Democratic and Republican parties"' brought suit arguing that
the blanket primary violated their rights of free association un-
der the First Amendment."5 All the plaintiff parties had rules
prohibiting nonmembers from voting in their primaries."6
Thus, the parties argued that being forced to allow nonmem-
bers to vote in their primary elections, thereby giving nonmem-
bers a role in the crucial process of selecting party nominees to
proceed to the general election, was a fundamental impairment
of a party's associational rights."7 The political parties asserted
that "[tihe single most important way that a party defines and
advances the interests of its members is through the choice of
its nominees, " "' which is "the central function of a politicalparty.""9 The State argued that while political parties may
110. Id. at 215 n.6.
111. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000).
112. Id. at 570. The Court failed to find any significance in the fact that the
voters themselves had elected to institute the blanket primary system. See id.
113. See supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text for a review of blanket
primaries.
114. Two minor parties, the Libertarian Party of California and the Peace
and Freedom Party, were also plaintiffs in the suit. Jones, 530 U.S. at 571.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Brief for Petitioner at 17, Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567
(2000) (No. 99-401).
118. Id. at 20.
119. Id. at 17.
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have associational rights under the First Amendment, those
rights are "not absolute," but rather are subordinate to the
states' rights to regulate elections, as granted by Article I of the
Constitution.
20
The Jones Court dedicated the bulk of its analysis to
weighing the state's interests in regulating electoral processes
against the party's interests in preserving its rights to free as-
sociation. The Court began the analysis by first asserting, un-
equivocally, "States have a major role to play in structuring
and monitoring the election process, including primaries." 2' In
support of this argument the Court cited several cases that
have addressed this issue, though in each case the issue was
raised in a context quite different from that of Jones.2 ' While
specifying some instances in which state regulation of the elec-
toral process is legal and necessary, the Court carefully pointed
out that approval of some state regulatory procedures did not
mean that "the processes by which political parties select their
nominees are.., wholly public affairs that States may regulate
freely.
" 123
After acknowledging the necessary role states play in regu-
lating the electoral process, the Court noted that political par-
ties have been critical throughout history to the advancement
of democracy, 124 and further that "[t]he moment of choosing the
party's nominee.., is 'the crucial juncture'" for the party.125
Thus, with both states and parties critical to the primary elec-
tion process, consideration of the rights of these two players re-
120. Brief for Respondent at 18, Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S.
567 (2000) (No. 99-401). Article I grants the state the power to prescribe the
"Times, Places, and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representa-
tives." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4. The Court has held this power to extend to the
regulation of elections for state offices as well. See Tashjian v. Republican
Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 217 (1986).
121. Jones, 530 U.S. at 572.
122. For example, the Court cited a case in which it held that states can
require parties to select their candidates through primaries, id. (citing Am.
Party of Tex. v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974)); a case in which it held states can
require parties to regulate ballot access to prevent frivolous candidacies, id.
(citing Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971)); and a case which upheld the
right of the states to require party registration before a primary election, id.
(citing Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752 (1973)). It is worth noting that each
of these cases analyzes a stage of the electoral process much earlier than the
primary election itself.
123. Id. at 572-73.
124. Id. at 574 ("The formation of national political parties was almost con-
current with the formation of the Republic itself.").
125. Id. at 575 (quoting Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 216).
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quired the Court to engage in a delicate balancing act. Drawing
heavily from precedent, 126 the Court stated that individuals
have associational rights to affiliate with the political party
they choose, but that political parties also have distinct free-
dom of association rights, and that a "nonmember's desire to
participate in the party's affairs is overborne by the counter-
vailing and legitimate right of the party to determine its own
membership qualifications."2 7 Additionally in Jones, the Court
relied on La Follette in particular for the premise that political
parties have the right to limit the people with whom they
choose to associate: "That is to say, a corollary of the right to
associate is the right not to associate." 128 The Court held that
this "right to exclude" is most critical for a party during its
nominee selection process, and any state regulation forcing the
parties to allow nonparty members' participation is likely to be
considered a "substantial intrusion."29
Having established that states have a role in the electoral
process, but that political parties have played a critical role in
representative democracy and thereby deserve special constitu-
tional consideration,' the Court declared that the First
Amendment associational protections granted to political par-
ties are most critically preserved during the nomination proc-
ess.' The Court asserted that the nomination process is
granted "special protection" because of how significant the
process is to the party: "[T]he moment of choosing the party's
nominee.., is 'the crucial juncture at which the appeal to
common principles may be translated into concerted action, and
hence to political power. "'32 The Jones Court equated the nomi-
nation process with the process of determining the party's posi-
tions through the selection of a "standard bearer who best
represents the party's ideologies and preferences." 33 In further-
ance of this argument, the Court relied on precedent that also
heavily protected the associational rights of parties, though,
126. The Court in Jones relied particularly on Democratic Party of United
States v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107 (1981), and Tashjian, 479
U.S. 208.
127. Jones, 530 U.S. at 583 (citing Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 215 n.6).
128. Id. at 574.
129. Id. at 576 (quoting La Follette, 450 U.S. at 126).
130. Id. at 574.
131. Id. at 575.
132. Id. (quoting Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 216).
133. Id. (quoting Eu v. S.F. County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214,
224 (1989)).
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134
notably, at different stages of the electoral process.
Noting the sanctity of the nomination process, the Court
asserted that any state regulation mandating that parties
allow nonmembers to participate in a party primary is likely to
be considered a substantial intrusion on the party. 13 Having
determined that the blanket primary constituted a severe bur-
den on parties' associational rights, the Court required that the
state interests in conducting a blanket primary be narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling state interest. 136 Of the seven
interests offered by the state, the Court outright declared three
of them to be illegitimate: the state's interest in producing more
representative candidates, in expanding the scope of debate,
and in providing a forum in which independents and minority
party members in safe districts can vote. 37 The Court dismissed
the state's remaining four asserted interests in "promoting
fairness, affording voters greater choice, increasing voter par-
ticipation, and protecting privacy" by declaring that they were
not compelling interests in light of the specific circumstances of
the case. 3 Further, the Court asserted that even if any of the
interests were compelling, the institution of a blanket primary
is not a narrowly tailored method of achieving them.'39 The
Court ultimately held that because the interests were not com-
pelling and the means were not narrowly tailored, and because
the burden on the parties' associational rights was significant,
California's blanket primary was unconstitutional.
40
The Court only briefly addressed open primaries in its de-
cision, explicitly stating that the case did not require it to con-
sider the constitutionality of open primaries.14 ' The Court first
134. See, e.g., Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351
(1997); Eu v. S.F. County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214 (1989);
Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208 (1986); Democratic Party
of United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107 (1981).
135. Jones, 530 U.S. at 576 (quoting La Follette, 450 U.S. at 126). The
Court suggested that the number of cross-over (and independent) voters in
primaries is significant because these voters not only influence the candidate
that gets selected, but also force the selected candidate to moderate his posi-
tion in order to win the general election. Id. at 579-80. The rationale is that
unaffiliated voters prefer more moderate positions and candidates, thus can-
didates in open elections must appeal to a broader base. Id. at 580.
136. Id. at 582 (citing Timmons, 520 U.S. at 358).
137. Id. at 582-83.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 585.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 577 n.8.
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distinguished closed primaries from blanket primaries by point-
ing out that in closed primaries, "even when it is made quite
easy for a voter to change his party affiliation the day of the
primary.., at least he must formally become a member of the
party; and once he does so, he is limited to voting for candidates
of that party.""' The Court then carefully, albeit briefly, distin-
guished open primaries from both closed and blanket primaries
by noting that "[i]n this sense, the blanket primary also may be
constitutionally distinct from the open primary.., in which the
voter is limited to one party's ballot."'43 It ended this analysis
by quoting the dissent in La Follette to assert that "the act of
voting in the Democratic primary fairly can be described as an
act of affiliation with the Democratic Party."'44
IV. THE TRIPARTITE MODEL AND THE ELECTORAL
PROCESS CONTINUUM: BALANCING THE PARTY'S
ASSOCIATIONAL RIGHTS AT EACH STAGE
OF THE PROCESS
A coherent understanding of party membership and func-
tion will greatly influence any assessment of a party's associa-
tional rights. The Jones case can be viewed as the last stop in a
line of cases that has strengthened the rights of the party-
organization ("organization") at the expense of the party-
electorate ("electorate").'45 Still, it is often difficult to reconcile
the holdings of the cases involving political parties, because at
different times the Court seemed to be emphasizing different
aspects of the party's associational rights. 1
46
Implementing a functional model of political parties in
election law analysis, such as the tripartite model discussed in
Part II, would advantage the Court in several ways. It would
142. Id. at 577.
143. Id. at 577 n.8.
144. Id. (quoting Democratic Party of United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. La
Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 130 n.2 (Powell, J., dissenting)).
145. For purposes of fluidity, the components of the party-the party-
government, consisting of the parties' elected officials; the party-organization,
consisting of the party activists; and the party-electorate, consisting of groups
of voters who identify themselves with the party in some way-will in the fol-
lowing sections be referred to by less cumbersome terms: government, organi-
zation, and electorate, respectively. For a review of the role of each component,
see supra Part II.
146. See Garrett, supra note 48, at 99 (stating that "there are elements of
political parties on both sides of every case concerning parties that comes to
the courts").
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require the Court to acknowledge that the issues in election law
cases are derived from an electoral process during which differ-
ent components of the party have different degrees of power
and different rights at stake.147 Up to now, the Court has
strictly protected the organization's associational rights, often
to the detriment of the rights of the electorate, but presented
the analysis as a protection of rights of the party as a whole."4
Implementation of the tripartite party model would enable the
court to more closely consider the rights of each component of
the party and examine where along the continuum of the elec-
tion process those rights should be most strictly preserved. This
analysis would provide the Court with a more balanced and
consistent approach to future cases.
This Note suggests that the weighing and balancing of as-
sociational rights must be conducted along an "electoral process
continuum," with the rights of each component of the party
given different weight at each stage of the continuum. At the
earliest stage of the process, the ballot access stage, the party-
government's ("government") interests are best preserved, at
minimal cost to the organization and electorate. At the next
stages, the convention and endorsement stages, the organiza-
tion's associational interests are most implicated and thus best
preserved, at less significant cost to the government and elec-
torate. Finally, at the last stage of the primary process, the di-
rect primary stage, the rights of the electorate should be recog-
nized as premiere. This analysis will be developed in the
context of the cases discussed in Part III.
A. THE PREPRIMARY CASES
1. Ballot Access Is the Province of the Party-Government
Ballot access rules determine which candidates are
afforded positions on the primary ballot.'49 At issue in
Timmons' 5° was a state statute preventing candidates from
running on the ballot under the banner of more than one
party."' In upholding the statute as constitutional, the Court
enforced a government regulation of the organization in the
147. See supra Part III.
148. See supra Part III.
149. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
150. Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997).
151. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
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interest of political stability.'52
The ability to get onto a primary ballot might properly be
viewed as the first step in the primary electoral process. At this
stage, it could be argued that the rights at stake minimally in-
volve the electorate because the majority of the electorate likely
does not even know who the possible candidates are.1 53 Viewed
as such, the ban on fusion candidates (the specific issue in
Timmons) more obviously becomes a balancing test between
the rights of the organization to run the candidate of its choos-
ing and the rights of the government to preserve a stable elec-
toral process. In conducting this balancing test in Timmons, the
Court was correct to hold that the rights of the government,
and thus the statutory ban on fusion candidacies, should be
upheld.' The associational burden on the organization is
minimal: It can still run any other candidate of its choice, and
members are not restricted from throwing their support behind
a candidate running under the banner of another party. 55 As
the Court indicated, if the organization's main goal is to help
elect a certain candidate, party members still have all of the
same resources at their disposal to do this, short of having their
party's name on the ballot next to the candidate.
5 6
152. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
153. It is important to note that some scholars view the ballot access stage
not as a balancing of rights between the state and the party-organization, but
instead as a balancing of rights between the state or party-organization and
the electorate. See BOTT, supra note 10, at 93 (discussing how parties in con-
trol can use the lawmaking process to reduce the threat of challenges on the
ballot from other parties); see also Nathaniel Persily, Candidates v. Parties:
The Constitutional Constraints on Primary Ballot Access Laws, 89 GEO. L.J.
2181, 2186 (2001) ("In the context of a primary ballot access lawsuit, the court
must determine the constitutional limits on the power of the party organiza-
tion and the party-in-the-[government] to limit the choices available to the
party-in-the-electorate."). Scholars such as Persily argue that because primary
ballot access laws can have serious implications on the party-electorate's First
Amendment rights of association (in that ballot access laws restrict the elec-
torate's associational rights at the earliest possible stage), ballot access laws
should come under strict constitutional scrutiny. See id. Still, the Court has
demonstrated that it is willing to strike down unreasonably restrictive ballot
access laws, such as those requiring filing fees. See, e.g., Lubin v. Panish, 415
U.S. 709 (1974); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972). Additionally, as the
Timmons Court pointed out, in cases of fusion candidacies, the candidate will
appear on the ballot under the label of one party, and so the electorate does
have the opportunity to vote for that candidate. See Timmons v. Twin Cities
Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 352 (1997).
154. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
155. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
156. See Timmons, 520 U.S. at 369.
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Further, it makes sense to favor the government's rights at
the ballot access stage because the government is charged with
running the election and thus maintaining ballot integrity and
avoiding frivolous candidacies. 157 The government is in a better
position than the organization to govern ballot access because
the government is better positioned to implement impartial
requirements. Allowing the government to mandate specific
rules for getting a candidate's name on a ballot restricts the
parties' ability to tailor access rules to their own ends. 15 8 If the
government is allowed to dictate ballot access rules, then all
the parties are on notice regarding ballot access requirements,
and all major parties can be held to the same standards. While
the organizations may, and have, argued that giving govern-
ment the latitude to determine candidate ballot requirements
unfairly infringes upon party rights, 9 the burden must be
viewed in context. The organization has the opportunity to fully
exercise its associational rights at the convention and through
the endorsement system. 60
2. Endorsements and Conventions Are the Province
of the Party-Organization
In Eu,"' the Court struck down a statute that prevented
parties from endorsing or opposing candidates in the primary
election.'62 It is important to note that in this case the Court
appeared to equate the party's endorsement of a candidate with
the party's identification of the political association and selec-
tion of the standard bearer. 16 3 It is also important to note that
in the endorsement process, candidate selection through voting
is never at issue, thereby minimizing the role of the electorate.
Preserving the organization's right to endorse over the govern-
ment's endorsement prohibition makes sense if the endorse-
ment stage is viewed as the province of the organization. In its
discussion, the Court noted that the endorsement ban pre-
157. The Court routinely acknowledges that these are valid state interests.
See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
158. See BOTT, supra note 10, at 93 (discussing how parties with too much
control over the ballot access process sometimes attempt to manipulate it to
their own ends).
159. This was the issue in Timmons. See supra notes 71-76 and accompa-
nying text.
160. See infra Part IV.A.2.
161. Eu v. S.F. County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214 (1989).
162. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
163. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
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vented party-governing bodies from conveying their candidate
preferences to voters, effectively restricting the party's ability
to spread its message.16 4 With this language the Court implic-
itly acknowledged that the endorsement process is a tool for the
organization to use in communicating with the electorate. The
endorsement process is a powerful means by which the organi-
zation retains influence over primary candidate selection.
165
The government's stake in this process is minimal (in fact the
Court questioned how limiting endorsement furthered any
state interest),66 and few if any of the electorate's rights are at
issue. Thus, preferring the rights of the organization over the
interests of the other two party components at this stage is a
sensible approach that does not unduly burden interests of any
component of the party.
The party convention is another stage in the electoral proc-
ess that should properly be considered the province of the or-
ganization. The preprimary convention is a place where party
members alone can meet to discuss the most effective means of
furthering the organization's goals.67 In La Follette, the Court
strictly protected the organization's choice to determine the
makeup of its delegates to the national convention. 6 '
It is reasonable to strictly favor the associational rights of
the organization in the context of convention regulations. At a
convention, the boundaries of participation and association are
much clearer than they are at other stages of the electoral
process. The convention provides an opportunity for the organi-
zation to meet in one place and deliver speeches, formulate
party platforms, and nominate candidates.'6 9 In effect, "[t]he
party convention represents the purest expression of the 'party
as organization'. . . . For the week [delegates] convene, they en-
gage in pure acts of speech and association.', 7 In a sense, there
is no role for the electorate at a convention; further, at what
can rightly be viewed as a "private affair," there is no role for
government regulation.
164. Eu, 489 U.S. at 223.
165. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
166. Eu, 489 U.S. at 226 n.16 (noting the Court's skepticism about the
State's claim that the endorsement ban served compelling state interests by
pointing out that the State admitted it has never even enforced the challenged
law).
167. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
169. Persily, supra note 153, at 2218.
170. Id.
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3. Summary of the Preprimary Cases
The Court's lack of concern for the rights of the electorate
in the preprimary cases illustrates a weighing of rights that
comports with the tripartite definition of a party. When power
encompasses ballot access, the government's concerns are
paramount to those of the organization.'71 When power relates
to endorsement, the organization's concerns in "selecting its
standard bearer" via the endorsement process are valued over
the government's asserted interest in maintaining a stable gov-
ernment and protecting voters from confusion and undue influ-
ence. 172 Finally, when power encompasses roles at the party's
convention, the Court is most clear that the processes of con-
ducting the convention and determining selection of delegates
are the province of the organization. 1
73
Again, it is critical to note that each phase of this proc-
ess-ballot access, endorsement, and convention-is a linear
step in the electoral process leading to the primary election.
The culmination of the process, the primary election, is directly
at issue in the next section's analysis.
B. THE PRIMARY STAGE CASES
A review of the primary stage cases reveals that while
states can conduct closed primaries and thereby allow parties
to limit participation in their primaries to party members,74
states cannot force a party to exclude independent and unaffili-
ated voters from a primary if the party chooses to include these
voters.7 5 Additionally, a state cannot force parties to include
"wholly unaffiliated" voters in their elections by virtue of blan-ket " .176
ket primaries. Initially, these cases seem difficult to reconcile.However, this Note suggests that the cases can be reconciled by
171. See Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997); see
also supra note 71 and accompanying text.
172. Eu v. S.F. County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214 (1989); see
also supra note 87 and accompanying text.
173. Democratic Party of United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450
U.S. 107 (1981); see also supra note 95 and accompanying text.
174. Nader v. Schaffer, 417 F. Supp. 837 (D. Conn. 1976) (three-judge
court), affd mem., 429 U.S. 989 (1976); see also supra note 102 and accompa-
nying text.
175. Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208 (1986); see also
supra note 108 and accompanying text.
176. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000); see also supra
note 140 and accompanying text.
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an employment of the tripartite definition of parties,"' a con-
ception of the electoral process as a series of stages leading to
the primary election,' and an appreciation of the Court's dis-
tinction between political party membership and affiliation.
179
1. The Government Cannot Prevent the Organization
from Conducting Closed Primaries
In Nader,'8° the district court upheld the right of the state
to conduct closed primary elections that prevented nonmem-
bers from voting.'8' Significantly, the plaintiff voters had no
connection, either by membership or affiliation, to the party in
whose primary they wanted to participate. 82 This case is espe-
cially interesting when examined with the tripartite party
model in mind,8 3 as it is one of the few cases in which the court
observed that the primary election is a single component of a
larger process. The court in Nader pointed out that the primary
in Connecticut was the last step of the nominating process, and
that at conventions prior to the primary major parties "choose a
candidate for nomination to each of the state or district of-
fices."'84 If the candidate chosen at the convention is not op-
posed, she proceeds to the general election. 8 5 A non-endorsed
candidate may "force a primary" after receiving a certain per-
centage of delegate votes at the convention, paying a fee, and
collecting petition signatures.' 8 With this analysis of the proc-
ess, the court implicitly acknowledged that different party
components have different rights at stake during each stage.
The court, however, failed to draw the logical conclusion: that
the organization chose its candidate for nomination at the con-
177. See supra Part II.
178. See supra Part III.
179. This is the distinction the Court relied on to rescue open primaries
from being declared unconstitutional under Jones. See infra Part IV.B.3.
180. Nader v. Schaffer, 417 F. Supp. 837 (D. Conn. 1976) (three-judge
court), affd mem., 429 U.S. 989 (1976).
181. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
182. The voters in the case did not even qualify as members of the elector-
ate, and are more properly viewed as members of the public at large because
members of the electorate are either registered or affiliated in some way with
the party. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
183. See supra Part II for a review of the tripartite model.
184. Nader, 417 F. Supp. at 841 (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-382
(1963)).
185. Id. (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 9-408 and 9-409 (1963) (repealed
2003)).
186. Id. (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-400 (1963) (amended 2003)).
2003] 185
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
vention, and thus anything that follows, namely a "forced pri-
mary," cannot properly be defined as a place where the organi-
zation is choosing its candidate. A primary is forced when a
candidate not chosen by the party at the convention decides to
appeal directly to the electorate for nomination through the
petition process."'
2. The Government Cannot Prevent the Organization
from Opening a Closed Election to Independent Voters
The Tashjian Court upheld the organization's rule that
permitted unaffiliated voters to vote in Connecticut's closed
primary election, a party rule that overrode the state's closed
primary statute."' 8 In this case the Court again took into ac-
count the significance of the fact that the primary follows a
party convention. 8 9 The Court pointed out that to obtain a
place on the primary ballot, the candidate "must have obtained
at least 20% of the vote at a Party convention, which only Party
members may attend."190 This statement suggests the Court
understood the significance of the power the organization has
at the convention stage and implies that the Court recognized
the importance of balancing the interests of the organization
with the interests of the electorate at different stages of the
process.
3. The Government Cannot Conduct Blanket Primaries that
Force Organizations to Allow Entirely Unaffiliated Voters to
Participate in Party Primaries
The Court in Jones struck down blanket primary elections,
which force parties to include independent and unaffiliated
voters in their primaries. 8 ' Many critics saw this holding as the
death knell not only for blanket primaries but also for open
primaries.8 2 These critics, however, have overlooked the crucial
distinction the Court in Jones made between party membership
and party affiliation. Although the Court failed to fully develop
187. Id. The petition must include signatures equal to one percent of the
votes cast for the same office at the last preceding election. Id. (citing CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 9-453d (1971)).
188. See Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 224 (1986);
see also supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
189. Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 220-21.
190. Id.
191. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
192. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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this distinction,9 3 it is crucial to understanding the significance
of the differences among the primary systems. More directly, it
is a critical component to understanding why the Jones decision
did not invalidate open primaries.
Membership in a political party requires some act of formal
enrollment, through regstration or by virtue of voting in a
party's closed primary. Membership characterizes the gov-
ernment and organization, and the associational rights of
members are strictly preserved at early stages of the candidate
selection process. 9' Though the distinction between affiliation
and membership may initially seem a thin one, it is a signifi-
cant one in a legal analysis involving political parties. In the
political party context, membership and affiliation carry differ-
ent meanings than they do when applied to other, more tradi-
tional organizations.' Thus, when analyzing membership and
affiliation with political parties, the familiar yardsticks do not
apply. Becoming a member of a political party does not man-
date that dues be paid, meetings be attended, or even certain
votes be cast. 97 More typically, membership is generally char-
acterized as a "housekeeping" tool that allows the parties to
better coordinate campaigns, solicit donations, and keep track
of voters. 19 Further, the distinction between membership and
affiliation is employed in a significant way in non-election-law
cases involving political party considerations. For example, in
cases where political affiliation is considered a necessary char-
acteristic for the performance of a particular job, the Court's
traditional understanding is that "political affiliation' refers to
commonality of political purpose and support, not political
party membership. " '99
193. The discussion is confined to footnote 8 of the opinion. See supra notes
6, 141-42.
194. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
195. See supra Part IV.A.
196. Some scholars have characterized the distinction by drawing an anal-
ogy with sports teams. The distinction between being a member of a sports
team and being affiliated with a sports team is quite apparent, and team af-
filiates conduct much of the same behavior as party affiliates do, such as en-
gaging in supportive behavior, tracking successes and failures, and recruiting
converts. See Garrett, supra note 48, at 103.
197. See BECK & SORAUF, supra note 29, at 7-12; KEY, supra note 12, at
163-65.
198. See KEY, supra note 12, at 163-65.
199. See Williams v. City of River Rouge, 909 F.2d 151, 153 n.4 (6th Cir.
1990) (acknowledging this as the reasoning the Supreme Court has used in
cases such as Balogh v. Charron, 855 F.2d 356 (6th Cir. 1988)).
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This distinction comports with the tripartite understand-
ing of political parties and the Court's analysis of the different
stages of the electoral process, as well as the different primary
systems discussed in Jones. Membership best characterizes the
government and organization, and the constitutional rights of
these party members are firmly protected by the Court
throughout the preprimary stages of the electoral process.200
Affiliation, on the other hand, characterizes the electorate, and
the electorate exercises this affiliation in its most significant
way through voting in the primary.2"' As the Court repeatedly
emphasized, the party's primary plays a crucial function for the
party, as it produces the nominee that will continue to the gen-
eral election.0 2 Because the government and organization have
their associational rights emphasized and protected during the
earlier steps in the process, such as the ballot access, endorse-
ment, and convention stages, the primary should be considered
the province of the electorate. Essentially, the primary is the
only step in the process where the voters of the electorate can
fully exercise their roles as party affiliates.2 3 In fact, the act of
voting in a party's primary can fairly be seen as one of the most
significant acts of affiliation the electorate can accomplish.
Arguably an unregistered, independent voter who voted for a
party's candidates in an open election has affiliated herself
with the party in a more significant way than an enrolled party
member who did not vote at all in that primary.
Additionally, focusing on the rights of the electorate during
the primary stage comports with the seminal reason parties
moved to implement direct primaries: "[T]he purpose of nomi-
nating by primary elections is to enable voters, rather than a
party organization or leaders, to choose the nominee."2 4 Pro-
tecting the rights of the organization over the rights of the elec-
torate at the primary stage suggests a failure of the primary
205
system.
200. See supra Part V.A.
201. See supra Part II.
202. See supra notes 125, 132-33 and accompanying text.
203. See supra Part II.
204. JEWELL & OLSON, supra note 47, at 104; see also BECK & SORAUF,
supra note 29, at 250 ("The direct primary perhaps can best be thought of...
as creating a veto body that passes on the work of party nominators ....").
205. See BECK & SORAUF, supra note 29, at 249 ("[11f one purpose of the
primary was to replace the caucuses and conventions of the party organiza-
tions as nominators, the primary fails when it falls under the sway of those
organizations.").
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This analysis culminates with Jones, in which the Court
suggested that as long as a voter has some connection to the
party, through membership or affiliation, that voter should be
allowed to vote in a party's primaries. °6 It is this connection to
the party, via membership or affiliation, that serves as the sub-
tle but crucial distinction among the primary systems, and that
rendered the blanket primary in Jones unconstitutional while
protecting open and closed primaries.0 7 For example, in states
with closed primaries, where only enrolled party members can
208vote, the organization leaders and the government are em-
phasizing, through the implementation of the closed primary
system, that the nomination process should not be influenced in
any way by voters who have made no effort to formally affiliate
with the party.20 9 In states with semi-closed primaries, those
enrolled as party members before the election can only vote in
their party's primary.20 The semi-closed primary, however, al-
lows for those who have not declared formal prior party affilia-
tion to participate in choosing the party's leaders on primary
election day.21' Thus, in semi-closed primary states, political af-
filiation is equated with voting for a single party's candidates in
the primary election, in contrast to the closed primary, where
political affiliation only occurs if a voter is registered with a
party in advance of the primary election.212 States with semi-
closed primaries view the act of selecting a party's leaders as
an act that is privileged in the sense that, by participating, vot-
ers are affiliating themselves with a party, but that participa-
tion should not be limited only to those who have affiliated with
211
a party in advance of the election.
On the other hand, in an open primary, a registered mem-
ber of one party may vote in another party's primary but is re-
quired to choose candidates from that party for each office on
the ballot. 14 By virtue of the act of voting for a single party's
206. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
207. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text (discussing closed pri-
maries).
209. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text (discussing semi-closed
primaries).
211. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
212. See supra Part I.A.
213. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text (discussing open prima-
ries).
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candidates, the voter has not enrolled with that party, but has
affiliated himself with it at the least for the time spent in the
• 211
polling booth. In states with open primaries, the organization
and government are less concerned with keeping out previously
unaffiliated voters or automatically enrolling voters in their
party after they vote than they are with ensuring that an act of
affiliation occurs at the voting booth through the selection of
candidates from a single party for all offices, even if this act
appears to demand minimal commitment to the party.1 6 In
open primary states, the act of voting for candidates from a
single party becomes an act of affiliation with that party.
It is the absence of this act of affiliation in blanket prima-
ries that rendered blanket primaries unconstitutional in
Jones.217 In a blanket primary, because any voter may switch
between parties when voting (for example, by voting for a
Democratic candidate for governor and a Republican candidate
for senator), the voter never actually affiliates with a single
party.2' 8 The voter is not required in any way to demonstrate
identity with a party, and the Court in Jones concluded that a
voter unwilling to affiliate in even the most minimal way with
a single party should not be allowed to vote in a direct pri-
219
mary.
C. POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE PROCESS IN THE
WAKE OF JONES
While the Jones majority suggested that the open primary
is safe from future constitutional attacks because of the distinc-
tion between membership and affiliation, this Note advances
an additional structure by which to understand the dinstinc-
tions among the many factors at play in the electoral process.
Specifically, the framework proposed in this Note, that of a tri-
partite model of political parties combined with an understand-
ing of the electoral process as a series of stages leading to the
primary, might serve as a useful tool for examining how to cor-
rect flaws in the electoral process without challenging the con-
stitutionality of state primary systems. For example,
215. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
216. See supra Part I.B.
217. See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text.
218. See supra Part I.C.
219. In a sense, the more appropriate forum for these voters is the general
election, where all voters are allowed to switch between parties when selecting
candidates.
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conceptualizing the primary itself as the province of the elec-
torate might shift the focus of the deterioration of political par-
ties back where it belongs, on the organizations themselves.
The electorate is in the unique position of comprising the bulk
of the party yet having little control over its direction, save for
its role in voting in elections.220 Both before and after this vote
is cast, however, it is the organization and the government that
must claim responsibility for the direction and success or fail-
ure of the party. Thus, while the party's concerns with its asso-
ciational rights are valid, and the Court has made every con-
cession to these concerns in its line of decisions,221 perhaps the
organizations' emphasis on determining who votes in their
primary elections is misplaced. The organization and govern-
ment, when challenging blanket primary elections, have as-
serted that opening primaries to either nonmembers or non-
affiliates threatens to change the party's message by allowing
nonmembers and non-affiliates to determine the party's posi-
tion through selection of its nominee, and the Court has not
disagreed with these assertions.222
In reality, however, defining the party's message is the re-
sponsibility of the organization to a large degree, and the gov-
ernment to a smaller degree. If the goal of the party as a whole
is to succeed in the general election, then the primary nominee
is not likely to get far without relying on the organization's di-
rection and support in defining the party's message, determin-
ing positions, and winning over the general electorate. In some
sense, it is the organization's responsibility, through endorse-
ment and caucuses and conventions, to present a strong slate of
candidates to voters in the primary so that the threat posed by
"cross-over" voters is minimal because any candidate the voters
chose would hold promise for the party. Relying on the courts to
protect against the threat of cross-over voters seemingly shifts
the focus away from the organization's responsibility to groom
compelling and loyal candidates who will appeal to a broad
spectrum of voters to a misplaced blame on the primary struc-
ture that allows independents or the unaffiliated to vote for a
candidate.
220. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
221. See supra Part III.
222. See Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 575 (2000) ("In no
area is the political association's right to exclude more important than in the
process of selecting a nominee.").
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CONCLUSION
In summary, the entire candidate selection process can,
and should, be viewed on a linear temporal model that requires
a constant balancing and shifting of different party compo-
nents' associational rights and different degrees of power over
the candidate selection process. At the earliest stage, the courts
have held that the party-government's constitutional rights are
most deserving of protection, through its regulation of ballot
access measures. The party-government gets to determine what
candidates must do to even appear on the ballot, the initial and
most fundamental step to being elected. The party-organization
has a similarly crucial role early in the electoral process in its
capacity to conduct a caucus or convention before the primary,
where it can select its candidate at an entirely private affair
free from associational burdens. If the party-government re-
quires that any caucus or convention be followed by a primary,
the party-organization still has the unrestricted ability to en-
dorse a candidate in the primary. These processes are powerful
and free from intrusive regulation and should be considered the
means by which the party-organization can select its standard
bearer.
In the last stage of the process, the primary itself, the
party-electorate has the opportunity to select its standard
bearer. The candidate chosen by the party-electorate may or
may not coincide with the candidate endorsed by the party-
organization, but if the party-organization has done its job, it
will have convinced the party-electorate to choose its preferred
candidate. The primary election phase of the electoral process
is where the party-electorate's rights should be favored, which
include the right of the independent and unaffiliated voters to
affiliate with the party by voting in its primary.
By construing the electoral process along a continuum in
this way and considering the political party in light of its three
components, the Court's primary election law jurisprudence can
be sufficiently reconciled and appropriately stabilized to the
benefit everyone interested in the electoral process.
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